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Abstract
The main purpose of this report is to identify, evaluate and if possible,
suggest reduction methods to the risks from which users at the beamline
BALDER, MAX IV Laboratory are exposed to during their visit. Identi-
fied risks includes radiation, fire, electricity, gases and miscellaneous risks
such as the overhead crane. The evaluation indicates that the handling
of toxic gases inside the experimental hutch is the highest risk for users
to be considered at BALDER. To improve the user safety at BALDER,
investigating the gas handling of gas cabinet nr. 5 is of great importance.
Also, looking over the safety instruction routines for arriving users and an
installment of a passage to the exp. hutch are to consider.
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1 Introduction
MAX IV is a national facility with Lund University as host institute. The facil-
ity including the buildings, the linac and the storage rings costs around SEK 3
billions and is funded by the governmental agencies Swedish Research Council
and Vinnova together with Lund University and Region Skane. Additional fund-
ing has been required for the different beamlines and around SEK 700 million
is funded for the first seven. It is mainly made by Knut and Alice Wallenberg
Foundation but also by different universities around Sweden and by some oper-
ators in Finland, Estonia and Denmark. The operating costs for MAX IV are
shared by Lund University and the Swedish Research Council.
MAX IV facility is a research facility located in Lund, Sweden that will use
synchrotron radiation for studying different types of samples. The light is cre-
ated using accelerated electrons transferred into one of the storage rings. At
certain points in the ring, the electrons are forced to loose energy and thereby
emit radiation, mostly in form of X-ray photons. The samples are then irradi-
ated in order to observe and study structures in both molecules and atoms as
well as solid structures. The main strength and purpose of building MAX IV is
the high brilliance of the photons for a specific energy interval, see figure 1. The
construction of MAX IV started in 2010 and will be inaugurated midsummer
2016.
The MAX IV Laboratory consists today of the MAX IV facility and MAX-lab.
MAX-lab itself consists of the MAX I, MAX II and the MAX III rings together
with a facility for nuclear research. MAX-lab is about to be dismantled and all
research activities will end in December 2015. This means that the use of the
name MAX IV facility probably will be phased out as the official name MAX
IV Laboratory and the unofficial short MAX IV will be used. Further on in
this report, MAX IV and MAX-lab will be used for the two different facilities
and the MAX IV Laboratory will be referring to both. Also users and guest
scientists will refer to the same persons i.e. those who performs experiments
at the MAX IV Laboratory. This is not entirely correct since staff, especially
beamline staff can and are users as well but not guest scientists.
The facility of MAX IV contain very powerful instruments to produce syn-
chrotron radiation. This will require unique safety measures for the staff and
for the guest scientists. The users who visit MAX IV will probably not have,
and don’t want to spend valuable experimental time to learn safety regulations.
Their nationalities will also be represented from all over the world, which mean
they might have different knowledge and understanding of safety regulations
from their own respective work places. Therefore, it is of high importance that
the risks related to their work at MAX IV are identified, evaluated and reduced
so that no accidents occur even when the users are stressed or tired from work-
ing long days. This report will mainly focus on risks that guest scientists (users)
can encounter and how to prevent accidents from happening, meaning focus on
the users and not the staff. This report will bring up the risks in a safety aspect,
not a security aspect, i.e. nothing about risks of persons who create hazards
intentionally.
4
Figure 1: The figure illustrates the brilliance as a function of photon energy
for some of the world leading synchrotron radiation facilities. The MAX IV
Laboratory’s main contribution is around 1-50 keV (corresponding to 0.4-1.2
nm in photon wavelength). [1]
1.1 Purpose
MAX IV is a facility which contains many different types of risks. The safety
group at the MAX IV Laboratory, which work with risk reduction and docu-
mentation regarding safety, has seen a need of a risk analysis that focus on the
users.
The main purpose of this report is to identify, evaluate and if possible,
suggest reduction methods to the risks from which users are exposed to during
their visit at the MAX IV facility. Since it is less complex and this analysis is
within a time frame, the report will concentrate on risks related to one of the
beamlines, BALDER at the 3 GeV ring. It will be focusing on aspects such
as exposure to radiation, the gas system, fire and electricity to mention a few.
These risks will then be identified and evaluated from a human, technological
and organizational (HTO) perspective. If possible, this report may be applied
to other beamlines as well. The questions this report wants to answer is:
• What type of risks are users at the beamline BALDER, MAX IV facility
exposed to?
• To what magnitude are these potential risks evaluated as?
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• Are there any suggestions to risk reducing measures?
Two secondary purposes are also made for this report. The first is to describe
the physics and systems of how the MAX IV facility works on a master student
in physics level. The second is to work as a substrate for forthcoming risk
analysis reports in the future. This purpose is in a high extent linked to the
main purpose since the information for the two will more or less be identical.
2 Method
The report was primarily made to identify and evaluate the risks users at the
beamline Balder at MAX IV are exposed to. In order to do so, it was important
to learn and understand how the MAX IV facility and BALDER work and how
the research performed at the facility is carried out. Different types of methods
were also made which leads to different perspectives and thereby more knowl-
edge of how potential improvements could be like. This is the general concept
of the risk analysis made for this report.
To identify potential risks at BALDER, different types of research were made;
on the internet, in books and interviews with relevant staff at the site. Since the
MAX IV facility is very similar to MAX-lab, it can be used in the research and
investigation of MAX IV. MAX-lab was therefore used as a reference of what
to expect at MAX IV regarding everything from risks, physics theory, routines
and regulations etc. Also, relevant practice for four weeks was carried out at
the beamline I811, since it is considered to be the most similar beamline at
MAX-lab compared to BALDER. Along with the practice at I811, interviews
with the safety manager, operating staff and project manager at the beamline
of both i811 and at BALDER, as well as the guest scientists at the i811 were
carried out. The interviews with the safety manager was continuously ongoing
throughout the writing of this report, regarding technical as well as risk related
issues and reasoning. Interviews with the operating staff and guest scientists
has mainly been carried out during the practice at I811 while two interviews of
an hour each has been made with the project manager of BALDER. Also, many
visits has been made to the construction site of MAX IV. Even if MAX IV and
BALDER isn’t finished yet, visits to the construction site has also been made
during the project in order to get an understanding how it will look like and
to obtain information that can be useful during the risk analysis. This include
everything from radiation safety and theoretical knowledge to the PSS (see 4.3).
In order to get another view of the risk analysis, information of the parts,
systems and processes were obtained in order to see how they could affect the
risks at BALDER in a positive or negative way. Especially a process description
of how guest scientist (user) visit looks like was carried through. This process is
described step by step from preparations before entering the MAX IV Labora-
tory until they leave. This process is somewhat different for different users, but
in general the process remains the same. Together with this process description,
a location description is produced for the locations within the site where the
users will be working or visiting. This will mainly refer to the experiment hutch,
the preparation lab or the control room. The purpose was then to merge the
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information of both description to be able to analyze what types of risks users
are exposed to, and when and where they occur. A so called ”Bowtie model”
(see section 3.6.5) was also used in order to evaluate some of the risks and to try
and identify were barriers could be implemented or improved. The identified
risks was then evaluated and put into a risk matrix shown in figure 15 in the
result section.
This report will not investigate the other beamlines except in a comparison
with BALDER. This report will only describe the fundamental parts of MAX
IV, such as the linac, the storage rings and as mentioned, the other beamlines.
Other parts as the main office building, the SPF (Short Pulse Facility) and the
possible future FEL (Free Electron Laser) will also not be of focus in this report.
There is also a chemistry lab in the main building. Since this may be used by
the scientists operating at BALDER, this will be, if only briefly and not fully
analyzed, mentioned in the report. Regarding BALDER itself, the optics hutch
will also only be mentioned briefly. The main reason is simply that when the
beam is running, no one is allowed in most of these areas. When the beam
isn’t running, the guest scientist themselves are only allowed in these areas in
the company of a guide with radiation protection clearance. They also don’t
have any purpose of operating in those areas, especially around the linac and
the storage ring. The exception may be the SPF, FEL (in the future) and the
main office building. The SPF and the FEL are however to consider as any
other different beamlines and at the main office building, the risks are similar
to any other office building. As mentioned, this report will focus on safety for
the users and not on security.
3 Theory
This section is categorized in subsections describing the parts of MAX IV and
its theory from the creation of electrons to the light reaches the experimental
hutches at the beamlines.
3.1 Linear Accelerator - linac
The main purpose of the linac in MAX IV, see figure 2, is to accelerate electrons
up to a maximum of 3.5 GeV. Firstly, the electrons are produced, which is done
in two different ways. Either by heating up a cathode which releases electrons
to the anode, so called thermal ionic, or by creating free electrons excited with
a laser. The electrons are then directed into the linear accelerator known as the
linac. To accelerate the electrons, cavities within the linac are put in sequences
where an electric field is applied. The electric field is alternating sinusoidally
made by a radio frequency of 3 GHz, and lined up so every other cavity has
the same field direction. The electrons are then injected to match the phase of
every cavity they go through in order to accelerate. Actually, the velocity of
the electrons is already very close to speed of light in the very beginning of the
linac. The so called acceleration process is instead made to raise the electrons
relativistic mass m according to Einstein’s relativistic formula for energy E, see
(1).
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E = mc2 (1)
The electrons can then ”ride the wave” almost like a surfer to gain relativistic
mass and thereby energy. The linac in MAX IV is 250 m long and placed
underground. The electron beam is either directed up to ground level to the
storage rings or continue below ground to the SPF (Short Pulse Facility) and
eventually to the FEL (Free Electron Laser) in the future. The linac produces,
accelerates and injects electrons into the storage rings every five minutes to make
up for lost electrons, the so called ”top up” system. This way experiments can
be performed continuously at high intensities. This can be compared with the
MAX II ring that only fill up electrons once every 12 hours which makes the
intensity more unstable and fluctuating. [2]
Figure 2: A part of the linear accelerator at the MAX IV Laboratory. [3]
3.2 The storage rings
MAX IV has two separate rings that are supplied with electrons from the linac
with circumferences of 96 and 528 meters. The smaller ring has an electron
energy of 1.5 GeV and can be compared to the previous MAX II with the same
electron energy and a circumference of 90 m. The bigger main ring stores 3
GeV electrons which allows other possibilities in research than the smaller ring.
However, all types of experiments that are made with the MAX II ring today do
not really require that high electron energy. The smaller ring therefore makes it
possible to have increased capacity even when MAX II is disassembled. Further
on, the ring that is referred to in this paper is the larger 3 GeV ring since it’s
the main reason of building MAX IV and the ring where beamline BALDER is
constructed, see figure 3.
As well as in the linac, the storage ring also has cavities in which an electric
field alternating sinusoidally. The purpose is however slightly different. Firstly,
these cavities makes up for the energy lost while moving in the ring so it re-
mains reasonably constant. Secondly, the cavities in the ring have a much lower
frequency, which makes the electrons come together in bigger bunches. If the
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Figure 3: Floor plan of MAX IV and the beamline BALDER.
electrons are slightly slow or fast, then the electric field makes them momentar-
ily speed up or slow down relative to its own bunch. However, if they are too
slow or fast, then they will fall out and vanish from the system. This process
is quite similar to ”natural selection” where only the electrons arriving at the
right time will survive. The electron bunches has a very short time duration, in
the order of 100 ps.
Except for the cavities, the ring itself mainly consists of vacuum pipes. The
vacuum pipes are surrounded by different types of magnets; dipole, quadrupole
and sextupole magnets. The dipole magnets (bending magnets) keeps the elec-
trons in its circuit and forces the electrons to bend off in the current direction.
Because of the increased size of the ring compared to MAX II, the centripetal
force, see (2) and thereby the reactive centrifugal force f is smaller since it
decreases if the radius r increases. This is however only correct as long as the
mass m don’t change.
F =
mv2
r
(2)
Quadrupole (see figure 5) and sextupole magnets are used to prevent the
electrons from moving out of its orbit in the circuit. However, since the electrons
at this speed (close to the speed of light) are strongly affected by the Lorentz
force, see (3).
F = q(E + v ×B) (3)
where q is the charge, E the energy, v the velocity and B the magnetic
field. This means that the magnets only can focus the beam in some of the
planes at a time since F is perpendicular to v and B, see figure 4. This makes
it necessary to tilt some of the focusing magnets and also use spaces between
them to maintain focus of the beam. The vacuum pipe is also smaller than the
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one at MAX II, these two factors makes it possible to achieve the same focus
and control of the beam curvature with smaller magnets. In MAX IV, these
magnets are placed together on different segments that makes the alignment of
the beam easier and cheaper to construct.
Figure 4: Magnetic field of an idealized quadrupole with forces. [6]
The MAX IV Laboratory has implemented many new techniques in order to
improve the quality of the beam. The most revolutionary is perhaps the ”Multi-
Bend Achromat” (MBA) which bends the electron beam in many steps built
in one solid block instead of using separate bending devices. This technique
will reduce the emittance of the beam as well as costs compared to conventional
methods. Other synchrotron facilities are today investigating or already upgrad-
ing their systems to use MBA’s instead, and of newly constructed or planned
synchrotron’s most of them will probably use this technique. The storage ring
itself will be finished in 2015. [4] [5]
3.2.1 Undulators and wigglers
Photons are emitted from the moving electrons in the storage ring when they
loose energy by accelerating in the bending sections. Light from bending mag-
nets can and is used for some experiments, for example at MAX-lab. However,
this kind of light has not as high intensity or energy as may be required in
some experiments. This problem is solved by so called wigglers and undulators.
They are made by applying a magnetic field B that is alternating along the
electrons path in the ring. This creates a transverse path in which the electrons
are oscillating with the wavelength λu depending of the undulator/wiggler. The
difference between these two is that the wiggler creates a broader spectrum of
synchrotron radiation than the undulator at higher energies. However, there
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Figure 5: A quadrupole magnet installed at the MAX IV Laboratory 3 GeV
storage ring. [3]
isn’t a straight line where it goes from a wiggler to an undulator and vice versa.
This is decided by the strength parameter K which is proportional to B and
λu, for K >> 1 it’s called a wiggler and for K < 1 an undulator. In between
(approximately) 1.5 < K < 5, there is a so called transition region.
To decide whether to use an undulator or a wiggler depends on the type of
light the experiment needs. The electrons through an undulator oscillates with
a lower amplitude than a wiggler. This means that the emitted photons will be
interacting in a higher extent and the beam will be higher focused and thereby
have a higher brilliance. For an undulator, it’s important to determine λu in or-
der to achieve constructive interference when the photons interact. The wiggler,
that uses stronger but fewer magnets, produces a much broader light with less
interactions. There are also no well defined harmonics as often in the case of an
undulator. However, since the bending curvature is higher, the emitted photons
will have higher energy instead. As mentioned before, the type of light used
depends on the experiment itself. Undulators produces a much more narrow
band light with high brilliance which sometimes is more useful than the broader
spectra. Undulators are also often used in the soft X-ray range to study sur-
faces, because at around 10 eV, the mean free path for electrons is very short
and only the surface electrons make it to the detector. However, the wiggler is
better to use when the experiment setup needs to be swept over energy by using
a monochromator. The brilliance becomes lower but the bandwidth is larger and
higher and therefore suitable for hard X-rays. The wiggler is also often better
when studying complete sample properties and not only the surface since the
higher energies makes the beam more penetrating. However, both techniques
can be used to excite electrons in order to emit fluorescence from the sample.
[7]
3.3 Beamlines
The light will be emitted from the wigglers and undulators into so called beam-
lines along the direction of the straight sections of the storage rings. Directly
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after the beam has left the storage ring, there is some kind of beam optics for
focusing. This consists of a concealed room at every beamline called the optics
hutch with clearance for authorized staff only. In the optics hutch, a monochro-
mator is also often used to disperse the synchrotron light in order to sweep the
sample over different well defined energies (or wavelengths). The end of most
beamlines consist of an experiment hutch. Here is where scientists (users) make
their experiments using different types of lights for different beamlines. Every
beamline will also be slightly different from the others to enable different types
of experiments. Adjacent to the exp. hutch there is a control room from where
the experiment is run and the data analyzed. Sometimes they also have a prepa-
ration lab nearby in order to prepare samples for experiments. The prep. lab
may also have a glove box and a fume cupboard in order to increase safety. All
beamlines aren’t planned yet and will be carried out in interaction with existing
and future user communities. MAX IV has a capacity for 19 beamlines in the 3
GeV ring, 11 in the 1.5 GeV ring and the beamline to the SPF in the basement
which doesn’t enter the storage ring. Eventually a Free Electron Laser (FEL)
also will be built in the basement. Even if the beamlines have the same purpose
of directing synchrotron light into an exp. hutch where samples are irradiated,
the beamlines may differ significantly in design depending on what type of pre-
ferred measurement technique. For example will chryotechnology with liquid
nitrogen or other types of gases be used to cool the sample in order to improve
the experimental results. It can also be the other way around so the samples
are heated up instead to achieve specific conditions. It is also important to
know which range of synchrotron light energy the experiment needs and which
technique to use. Some samples may also be harmful and needs to be handled
with special safety measures of the experimental setup. This report will mainly
focus on the beamline called BALDER at the 3 GeV ring at MAX IV since it’s
considered covering most of the expected risks regarding experiments from the
beamlines with the exception of lasers. The beamline is also the location where
users not only perform their experiments, but monitor them and prepare their
samples. For users, this is where they spend almost all their time during a visit.
3.4 BALDER
BALDER is one of the potential 19 beamlines that can be connected to the
3 GeV ring at MAX IV. BALDER has gotten its name from the god of light
and purity in Norse mythology. The inauguration of BALDER is planned along
with MAX IV itself in summer 2016. In the first stage only for friendly users
(beta testing) and then for all users in 2017. Overall it is quite similar to the
other beamlines in general with some differences. Experiments on this beamline
often requires different types of gases that are used in the chamber containing a
sample in the middle, or by just examine the gas itself. This will often be carried
out with certain pressure around and in connection to the sample, preliminary
up to a maximum of 50 bar. It will also be using an oven heating up samples
to maximum 900◦ Celsius. BALDER uses the techniques EXAFS and XANES
described below in section 3.4.1. It will use photon energies from 2.4 to 40 keV
and can be considered as an improved version of the recent beamline I811 at
current MAX II. I811 as well as BALDER in the near future, is often used on
samples with low concentrations of substances, as low as ppm.
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3.4.1 EXAFS and XANES
EXAFS stands for ”Extended X-ray Absorption Fine Structure” and is one of
the techniques in which BALDER will operate. It uses synchrotron light (hard
X-rays) to eject core electrons by the photoelectric effect, a so called photoelec-
tron from the sample. The atom from where the photoelectron was emitted
has now turned into an excited state, and the energy of the photoelectron plus
the binding energy will be equal to the absorbed photon energy. This only
happens for different materials at certain energies, a so called absorption edge.
When irradiating a sample with the incoming intensity I0, it’s possible to de-
tect for which energies the intensity after the sample I make a dip. This means
the transmission will decrease when the absorption increases. The absorption
increases rapidly for some energies and these peaks represent the binding en-
ergy of an electron within the sample. Each element has its own set of unique
absorption edges and the intensity is described by (4).
I = I0 · e−µx (4)
Where µ is the absorption coefficient and x is the sample thickness. The
reason of using X-rays is mainly because they are highly penetrating and can
therefore be used on solids and liquids as well as gases. However, EXAFS can
also be carried out indirect on non-penetrating samples by either measuring the
fluorescence of the emitted X-rays or the photoelectrons themselves. This cre-
ates an interference pattern that causes an oscillating EXAFS spectra. This is
then normalized and Fourier transformed in order to determine the coordination
of atoms within the sample. EXAFS is used with synchrotron light because of
its energy and its high brilliance which enables samples with as low concentra-
tions as down to ppm.
XANES, which stands for ”X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure” also known
as NEXAFS (”Near Edge X-ray Absorption Fine Structure”) also used at BALDER,
has the same method as EXAFS but is used for specifically studying the elec-
tronic transitions. As the name tells, XANES is focused on the near edge of
the spectra where atomic core ionization begins, unlike EXAFS, which mainly
covers the oscillations at higher energies (up to 1500 eV above the edge). The
near edge region where XANES operates is considered to be about 50-100 eV
over the edge. The total spectra over XANES and EXAFS is called XAFS. [8]
3.5 Radiation
There are many types of radiation, for example electromagnetic radiation and
particle radiation. Radiation can be divided into two groups: Ionizing radiation
and non-ionizing radiation. Ionizing radiation has enough energy to separate
electrons from atoms or molecules. The minimum ionization energy is around
10 eV to 33 eV depending on the atom or molecule. This section will mainly
focus on ionizing radiation from X-rays since its the main concern at MAX
IV Laboratory beamlines and any other synchrotron facility. Soft X-rays, i.e.
low-energetic X-rays have an energy around 100 eV to 10 keV while hard X-
rays (high-energetic X-rays) have an energy of 10 keV to 100 keV. BALDER
will mostly use the hard X-ray spectrum since this is where EXAFS primarily
has its region. Soft X-rays are however also used in other beamlines at MAX
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IV Laboratory. When the X-ray radiation mostly occurs within the beamlines,
gamma radiation is more common regarding the linac and the storage rings. In
the storage rings, electrons can lose energy and fall of the closed orbit, then
they hit the inner side of the pipe, slows down rapidly and produces gamma
radiation. Similar event regarding the linac where electrons also falls off the
lane and rapidly decrease in energy which results in gamma radiation. This
is however more of a concern for the staff than the guest scientist since they
usually only operate within the beamline area.
The equivalent dose for ionized radiation is measured in Sievert (Sv). The
equivalent dose represents absorbed dose to an organ or tissue weighted by the
weighting factor WR which depends on the type of radiation R. Sievert is a
unit in the International System of Units (SI) and represent the effects of ion-
ized radiation outside or inside the body where 1 Sv = 1 Joule/kilogram. The
equivalent absorbed dose HT of tissue T is defined as in (5).
HT =
∑
R
WR ·DW,R (5)
where DW,R is the mass-average absorbed dose in gray (Gy) in tissue T by
radiation type R. HT should not be confused with the effective dose E seen in
(6) which is the sum of the equivalent doses weighted by WT .
E =
∑
T
WT ·HT (6)
Often is it considered most important to analyze the effective dose since it
covers the whole body regarding all organs and tissues, but in some cases the
equivalent dose is as important as the effective dose. When it is known that
only a specific part of the body is exposed to ionizing radiation, the effective
dose may be relatively low but instead the equivalent dose is dangerously high
to that specific organ or tissue. This can lead to severe damage.
In Sweden, a person gets an effective dose of approximately 4 mSv a year.
The main contribution is radiation from space, medical examinations and ra-
dioactive materials, from the ground and water or within the body. Also, indoor
exposure from radon stands for around 2 mSv a year. At MAX-lab, the total
average additional effective dose is 0.3 mSv/year. [9]
3.6 Risk analysis theory
At MAX-lab, the MAX IV Laboratory and other similar facilities, it is neces-
sary to have staff constantly working with safety issues since it should be highest
priority in order to operate safely. In the long run, if a workplace is considered
safe and to be working systematically with safety, it becomes a more attractive
place to visit for both users and staff as well as ordinary guests.
Certain terms and words in this report require some basic knowledge about
risk analysis. This section will describe some of the terms to further on reading.
In order to carry out a risk analysis one has to first identify the potential risks
for the specific object that is analyzed. Thereafter, the magnitude of the risks
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must be evaluated so the right actions are made to efficiently reduce the most
severe risks.
3.6.1 Human, technology and organization - HTO
This report will handle the risks from a human, technical and a organizational
perspective. This means that by the risks that can occur, it is one or more of
these factors that is causing the accident. It can also be indirect dependence
when for example a person makes an error but the latent circumstances in
the organization is what leads to the accident or incident. For a company, an
official or any other workplace, it is very likely a combination of all three when
something goes wrong. Therefore, it is very important not to focus on one part
but at all three at once. Further on in this report; human, technology and
organization will be abbreviated to HTO.
3.6.2 The energy model
The energy model describes how some types of the threats is blocked by a
barrier to prevent damaging the target. The threat is described in form of
different types of energy, such as electrical energy, mechanical energy, chemical
energy or radiation. The barriers are created to isolate the threat from the
object it can damage, the so called target and can be anything from a human or
an animal to materials or the environment itself. Barriers can be physical like
a wall or insulation, but it can also be different types of procedures that must
be followed, education or protection in a system that prevents actions made in
the wrong sequence are also barriers.
3.6.3 The Reason ”Swiss cheese” model
The Swiss cheese model is about hazards making their way through holes or
gaps in barriers, see figure 6. These errors can be quite small but since they are
many in quantity, they create a path through the barriers which can lead to an
accident or hazard. The name refers to slices of Swiss cheese that has big holes
in it and where, in this model, hazards can pass. It can often be hard to detect
such risks since the deficiency is divided with different barriers. [10]
3.6.4 Plan, Do, Check, Act - The PDCA cycle
The PDCA cycle stands for Plan, Do, Check, Act. It is an iterative looped
method that goes on continuously and never ends. The first step is planning
to increase safety, what shall be made and what shall be accomplished. In the
next step, the plan is implemented and the process is executed. Under check,
the results of what have been made is examined to see which efforts that have
had an effect and those who haven’t or can be improved. If so, this is also
the time to find out how to improve the measures that have been made to be
able to implement those improvements in the last step called act. This process
is then repeated to continuously be able to improve the safety and never feel
totally satisfied with the result, since there is always more to do during the
next cycle. Especially since the organization itself may be reduced or expanded
during time. Also, outer factors like new technology which can be implemented
in the organization regarding safety makes it worth to redo the cycle. [12]
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Figure 6: An illustration over the Swiss cheese model. [11]
3.6.5 The Bowtie Method
The Bowtie Method is a diagram which illustrates how a ”top event” and a
hazards is caused and what type of outcome it can have. The top event is the
main event of the bowtie model and is often the moment when something gets
uncontrollable i.e. an explosion of a pressure vessel, someone slips on a roof and
falls down or two car collides. The hazard is something that can cause damage if
something goes wrong. To the top events described, the hazards can be storing
high pressure gas vessel, working on a roof and driving a car. The top event
should be carefully chosen but isn’t necessary decided directly and depends on
what threats and consequences identified. Threats is what causes the top event
and can be of different types yet still lead to the same hazard. Threats can
in the same order be heat increasing the pressure, slippery roof and to dodge
an animal. They are therefore placed before the top event. Consequences are
the potential outcomes of the top event and can be sever damage on nearby
buildings, a broken leg and a damaged car. Consequences are then placed after
the top event. The name bowtie method is referring to that it look like a bowtie
when the model is complete, see figure 7. [13]
Figure 7: An illustration over the bowtie method. [14]
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3.6.6 The SRK framework
To describe how much effort it takes for a person for different types of psycho-
logical processes, it is possible to speak about the SRK framework. SRK stands
for skills, rules and knowledge and is within these levels where the processes are
distributed. The framework/model was developed by Jens Rasmussen and is
referred to as ”Rasmussen’s SRK model”. [15]
The three levels are described as:
• Skill-based level: At the skill-based level, very little conscious control or
focus is needed to perform a task. This process is often made completely
automatic and makes it possible to concentrate on other things at the
same time. An example is to ride a bicycle.
• Rule-based level: At the rule-based level, there are already rules to follow
for a specific task. This means that no certain knowledge or insight of
how it works is needed as long as the rules are followed. This can be an
algorithm where things are thought to be in a specific order like an con-
struction manual and there is no need to know why it should be assembled
in a specific way.
• Knowledge-based level: The knowledge-based level describes the processes
that requires large focus and where it is needed have a greater knowledge
and understanding of the principles and laws within the system in order
to fulfill a task. This level is reached when something unexpected occurs
or when improvements and inventions of and in a system are made.
4 Parts, systems and processes at the MAX IV
Laboratory
4.1 Radiation protection
Radiation at synchrotron facilities is considered a great concern. The major
part of the radiation comes from the linac and the storage rings, but also from
the beamlines. The radiation diverges both radially from the beam and in its
current longitudinal direction. However, once the beam stops, the radiation
disappears immediately. In the linac and the storage rings, most of the radia-
tion comes from so called ”bremsstrahlung” in form of gamma radiation. This
happens when electrons falls out of its equilibrium orbit and decelerate in the
surrounding matter. In the exp. hutch, only X-ray radiation is present since
these wavelengths are filtered out from the synchrotron radiation. For most
countries, laws and regulations are enacted specially for accelerators. The laws
and regulations regarding the synchrotrons at MAX IV Laboratory are written
by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. Especially regulation 2008:27 re-
garding operations with accelerators, and regulation 2008:51 concerning basic
provisions for the protection of workers and the general public in practices in-
volving ionizing radiation.
At the MAX IV Laboratory, numerous of actions have been taken to reduce
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the amount of radiation where staff and visitors are present during operation.
Regarding the beamlines, their designs are quite different from each other, but
are still bound to the same restrictions and regulations regarding radiation pro-
tection.
Both MAX IV and MAX-lab are divided into three sections; normal areas,
protected areas and controlled areas. The unprotected areas are areas where
no specific training or safety equipment is needed. One may still need access
to these areas (see 4.5) but is safe from radiation and other potential risks not
included in an ordinary office building. The main normal area at MAX IV is
the main office building. Protected areas are areas like the main experimen-
tal hall and the hall for the second ring. This hall will be expanded to also
contain some offices meaning they will belong to the protected areas as well.
All persons who are working in protected areas must undergo the safety course
(see 4.2) and eventual other courses depending on the type of work. Controlled
areas are at both MAX IV and MAX-lab the linac tunnel, the two storage rings
and the beamline hutches including both the experimental and the optical. All
the beamline hutches at MAX IV are coated in orange to visually distinguish
them from the other protected or non-protected areas. This is done in order
to prevent anyone from attempts of entering those areas while the beam, and
thereby synchrotron radiation, is present. If so, the beam would directly shut
down because of the PSS (see section 4.3). The radiation protection of the
hutches is also improved compared to MAX-lab by using so called chicanes for
all cables and pipes leading in and out from the hutch. The chicanes prevent
radially emitted light leak out from the hutch compared to cable holes going
straight through the hutch walls, see figure 8.
Figure 8: The inside wall of the hutch facing the storage ring. The figure shows
the incoming pipes for the gas system from the cabinets outside. To the right,
a chicane without its cover is shown.
4.2 The safety course
Everyone who will work at the MAX IV Laboratory with the exception of those
who work in the main office building have to undergo a safety course. At current
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MAX-lab, the safety course consists of a twenty minute lecture with mandatory
knowledge regarding safety, custom made for MAX-lab. Some of the major
categories in the safety course are:
• Fire safety
• Measures in case of accidents
• Radiation: Area types and signals/signs
• Chemical treatment
This course will be revised for MAX IV and is currently under development.
It will probably contain a quite similar content with some improvements and
adaptions. It will be a web-based course with a basic block and additional
types of sections depending on what purpose of work or research for visiting the
facility. After the course is finished, it is necessary signing on in order to be
approved for work or research.
The new safety courses for guest scientists, staff and co workers at MAX IV
will be web-based and performed in MAX IV U (see section 4.4) consisting of
different blocks depending on what type of competence that is needed for spe-
cific types of work. For example, to use an overhead crane (not for ordinary
users) a person must undergo a special safety course for operating them. For
users, the safety course will be carried out after or during the visit registration
in pre-beamtime phase, see section 4.12. There will probably be three levels of
competence depending on which locations at the site the person need to access
where guest scientists will require the lowest access level. The idea is also to
adapt the safety course for the different beamlines, i.e. all scientists will have
to go through specific parts in the safety course which handles the safety aspect
at the beamline on which experiments will be carried out. If the users intend
to operate in the chemistry lab as well, an additional part of the safety course
(still at lowest level) is required. There is also practical instructions for users
by the beamline staff, further described in section 4.12.
4.3 PSS - The Personal Safety System
The Personal Safety System PSS is a system developed in order for the staff,
users and visitors to work and visit the MAX IV Laboratory safely. A safety
system like this isn’t anything unique and similar systems exist in some extent at
most types of industrial facilities over the world. However, the configurations of
the systems must always be adapted and regarding the MAX IV Laboratory, it
can be considered very complex and unique due to the high potential risks within
the facilities. The PSS can include accessibility for doors and gates, monitoring
and searching areas and safety procedures to follow in order to perform a task.
In general, it can include every system that has to do with increasing personal
safety. At the MAX IV Laboratory, the PSS is most often referred to the search
procedure in order to start or open the beam in controlled areas. The PSS
is described in further detail for the hutches of I811 and Balder in the next
sections.
19
4.3.1 PSS at the I811
When the experimental setup is complete, there is a small procedure also under
the PSS to be able to start the experiment. First, one makes sure that no one is
left behind in the exp. room. This is also made as a procedure where a button
called ”Start search” is pressed on the control panel. Thereafter a person has
twenty seconds to take the key, go across the exp. room (around 8 meters) to
insert and turn the key in another lock. Then take the key back to the control
panel and press ”Search complete”. When ”Start search” is pressed, a siren
and a warning light is activated for about thirty seconds. This system is made
to force a person to go across the room and control that no one is left behind.
Then, the door can be closed and the key can be turned on allowing the beam
stopper to open.
Considering this procedure from a HTO perspective, it is seen how the sys-
tem lays the responsibility for a safe experiment somewhere between humans
and technology. The safety measure forces a person to follow the right sequence
in order to operate the main system which in this case is the beamline. As
mentioned before, it’s preferable to blame the system when a person eventually
makes an error that can cause an accident. If the system is ”fail-safe”, then no
accident will happen no matter what sequence is used to perform a task. One
can argue if this system at the I811 is fail-safe or not. Persons are forced to
start the beam to a specific algorithm or the beam stopper will not move away
and the experiment can’t be carried out. It is fail-safe in that regard that one is
forced to move across the room in order to search for people left behind before
you close the door. However, it is not a complete fail-safe system since you only
force a person to go across the room, but he or she aren’t obliged to specifically
search for anyone as it is designed today. The key switch is placed on the wall
which doesn’t contribute to the search since focus should be in the opposite
direction. The walking path during the search don’t cover the whole room even
if its quite small, especially the floor behind the experiment table. The process
is often repeated numerous times a day for every sample that is tested. Some
guest scientists say that the procedure becomes a routine in which you don’t
necessary search for persons left behind, and only go through the procedure be-
cause it is necessary in order to start the experiment. The twenty second time
limit can also encourage to be quick and inattentive while searching. However,
as mentioned the room is relatively small for a person to be missing and even so,
the radiation doses are reasonable small and it will probably not be long before
a missing person is found. It is also rarely more than three or four people in the
exp. room at the same time. Still, if the search sequence becomes mechanistic
and no actual search is made during the process, then perhaps this PSS search
has room for improvement.
4.3.2 PSS at BALDER
The PSS at BALDER will look quite different from the one at the I811. As
seen in figure 9, BALDER will have four buttons for the search sequence within
the hutch that need to be pressed in the right order. Compared to the I811,
the Initiate search button (the green dot) is placed inside the hutch instead of
outside. Also, a time delay is implied making sure the buttons aren’t pressed too
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fast so the search becomes less carelessly made. Compared to the I811, there is
instead a maximum time which limits the search time. BALDER will also have
a search time limit, but it will be set so the person who is performing the search
shouldn’t feel any stress finishing the search in time. The time limit is mainly
to make sure that the search is made in one sequence and not interrupted in
between. The exact timescale for the different parts of the search sequence isn’t
determined yet, but the minimum time between pressing the search buttons
will probably be around 10 to 30 seconds. The PSS at MAX IV will have two
independent parallel systems to make sure that if one of the systems fails, there
is always an extra system operational. At BALDER, it will be possible to mount
multiple samples at one time unlike the I811. This will reduce the amount of
times the users have to go in the hutch to change samples and to run the search
sequence. The optics hutch for BALDER as well as all other hutches along with
the linac and storage rings will also have their own PSS. Since BALDER users
normally aren’t allowed in the optics hutch or the other controlled areas without
authorized personnel, this part is less relevant for this report. The safety staff
has the responsibility for the PSS at the MAX IV Laboratory.
Figure 9: The PSS at the BALDER exp. hutch. Starting with the initiate
search button, the searcher goes clockwise according to the figure and press the
other search buttons in that same order. After the last search button is pressed,
the searcher leaves the hutch to enter the control room and shut the door. At
last, the complete search button outside the hutch is pressed in order to finish
the search sequence. Note that the PSS include four emergency stop buttons
within the hutch as well.[18]
21
4.4 MAX IV U - A digital user interface
The digital user interface - MAX IV U is a web-based software to facilitate
for both staff and users at the MAX IV Laboratory. The purpose is to enable
people of working wherever they are and not forced to specific locations. For
the users, this makes it easier for them to send in proposals and taking care of
pre visit duties (see section 4.12). If their proposals are accepted, all users must
individually register their visit in MAX IV U. Here is also where they undergo
the mandatory web safety course.
4.5 RCO and SALTO - safety lock systems
Two different systems for accessing the around 500 doors will be used at MAX
IV. These are called RCO and SALTO which also are the names of the companies
delivering the systems. The main difference between these systems as they are
made for MAX IV, is that the RCO connected doors are constantly online and
communicating with a terminal where the accessibility for users is controlled.
The SALTO system however, is an oﬄine system which gets information about
accessibility and passages by the users own tags. The information within each
tag is updated daily when it’s used in one of the main connected devices. The
RCO system will be connected to the main doors entering the building and to
some of the more critical doors regarding personal safety, such as the doors to
the storage ring and the linac. The SALTO system will mainly be used inside
the building on doors which doesn’t lead to radiation protected or other safety
areas.
4.6 The beamline I811 at MAX-lab
Since BALDER, at the time of writing only exist in planning stage, it is hard
to make a proper risks analysis of the object. However, the current beamline
I811 is one of ten connected to MAX II and is considered to be quite similar to
BALDER. This makes it possible in some extent to analyze I811 in able to see
what types of risks there are today and what has been made to reduce them.
Also, to understand how the process of research is carried out by the guest
scientists and co workers at and around the beamline. EXAFS and XANES
are also the methods used at I811 which makes the equipment and the envi-
ronment similar to how BALDER will be. Certain experiment methods such as
diffraction spectroscopy is also used at the I811, but since it won’t be used at
BALDER, it is not further analyzed in the report.
I811 consist of the beamline itself that leads in to the experiment hutch. There
is also an adjacent control room to the hutch where the beamline is controlled
and results are analyzed. In order to enter the exp. hutch in which may contain
radiation, one has to first open the door with a key which must be inserted dur-
ing experiments. The key is placed right outside the door on a control panel.
When the key is turned off, there is an automatic beam stop made of thick lead
that prevents the beam from entering the currently safe exp. room. If someone
tries to open the door by force, the whole ring of MAX II is shut down which
thereby also affect the other users of MAX II beamlines. This can be seen as
a fail safe system and is a part of the Personal Safety System (PSS) where the
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combination of humans and technology is used to prevent anyone from entering
the room during an experiment.
There are other safety measures at I811 and most, if not all, will be imple-
mented at BALDER as well. Since they are already taken into consideration,
this report will only mention them briefly in the list below and only discuss
them if room for improvement is found.
• Oxygen and carbon monoxide detectors in the exp. hutch to detect low
oxygen levels or high poisonous gas levels.
• An overhead crane to facilitate heavy lifts.
• Overall lead protection with lead covered windows to prevent radiation
leakage from the exp. hutch.
4.7 The floor plan of BALDER
The beamline BALDER itself consist of, except for the optics hutch, the prep.
lab, the control room, the exp. hutch and a storage room as can be seen in
figure 10. There will also be a type of workshop somewhat right to the storage
room in the figure.
Figure 10: The floor plan of BALDER.
Since the construction of BALDER is made, it will probably be difficult to
implement changes to the things mentioned in this section regarding the floor
plan. The floor plans are also more or less different from each beamline which
means that parts in this section may already be dealt with at other parts of
MAX IV. The two main reasons why they are different is because they are all
planned by different teams and have different purposes. However, eventually
this section may be taking into consideration when developing new beamlines
in the future.
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• The door for entering the exp. hutch in between experiments is connected
to the control room. Even if the prep. lab is adjacent to the beamline
itself compared to the situation for I811, it is now necessary to transport
samples from the prep. lab to the hutch via the control room. This will
probably not be of any direct danger since the majority of the samples are
harmless, and it will only pass a fraction of the control room in the top
right corner. It can however still be seen as unnecessary, especially if the
sample is constituting a risk, since there is no direct purpose of having a
sample in the control room at any time. However, the downside of instead
having it connected directly to the prep. lab is that a person entering the
hutch must go by the prep. lab as well. In the design of I811, it may have
been the better solution since only one sample can be analyzed at a time
and has to be changed manually in between. This means that persons
entering the hutch have to enter the prep. lab to fetch samples almost
every time anyway. At BALDER however, numerous of samples can be
analyzed automatically meaning that scientists have to enter the hutch
significantly less, as low as two times; first to place the samples and then
to get the samples after the experiment. At the I811, every additional
sample means entering the hutch at least one time more.
The solution could be two doors into the hutch (except from the gate
that only is used when moving bigger equipment) one from the control
room and one from the prep. lab. This causes however other issues such
as a higher risk of anyone entering the room from one door when another
thinks it is empty. It will also require a more complex PSS and of course
an extra door, which leads to higher costs. The consequences for two doors
are in short probably higher than the gain.
Another thing to consider, since one of the purposes of the floor plan
is to reduce unnecessary visits in the prep. lab, is whether the door from
the main hall to the prep. lab should be accessible at all times or not. If
it is, no samples to the prep. lab have to go via the door from the main
hall to the control room. On the other hand, it may be used as the regular
door when entering BALDER which may not be the main purpose.
• Secondly, the control room is placed directly in the longitudinal beam
direction. Since the control room is where the guest scientists spend most
of their time during experiments, it can lead to unnecessary exposure
of radiation. But as mentioned before, the exp. hutch is a radiation
protected area and the walls are constructed to prevent radiation leakage
at any direction. The wall between the hutch and the control room is also
enhanced with a thickness of 12 mm led instead of the otherwise 7 mm at
the sides and 6 mm in the roof [16].
• The top right corner of the prep. lab (see figure 10) reduces the visibility
on the outside. Accidents can for example occur when someone is about
to deliver gas cylinders with a truck to BALDER when a person who has
adjusted the gas flow on the outside is about to go back inside to one of
the rooms. Since the nearest door in, is to the prep. lab, the chances
are that a collision and thereby an accident may take place. It should be
noted that since the gas system will be controlled from the control room
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(see section 4.8), the users themselves have no purpose of being near the
gas cylinders at any time.
4.8 The gas system at BALDER
BALDER will have a quite complex system for providing gas to the experiments
into the hutch. Only a few beamlines at MAX IV will have the opportunity to
work with gases in their experiments and only BALDER will have the possibility
to obtain as high pressures as up to 50 bar. The gas handling is one of the major
concerns at BALDER and a lot of improvements has been made compared to
the I811 and MAX-lab in general:
• The gas cylinders are now located outside the hutch instead, except for
the user gas cabinet nr. 5. They are also placed inside 30 minutes fire
proof gas cabinets for extra protection. This seals off most of the gas from
the enclosure of the hutch. There will be a possibility for bringing own
special gases by the guest scientists themselves, they are however most
likely to be placed inside cabinet nr. 5 in the hutch but it is not finally
decided.
• The gas system is further developed. Except for the chicanes to prevent
radiation leakage, the pipes and equipment to connect the gas cylinders
are made to increase compatibility so that guest scientist don’t have to
bring their own systems. This insures an extra control over quality and
management of the system to the staff compared to today.
• All gas cylinders used at BALDER and the rest of the gas demanding
beamlines will be distributed from MAX IV’s own intake in order to have
control over which gases that are present in the facility.
• Major technical improvements will let the users control, mix and monitor
gases and gas flow from the computers in the control room, no manual
adjustments on vents and cranes is necessary.
There will be five gas cabinets connected to BALDER; The first contains
inert gases such as helium, argon and nitrogen gas. Cabinets 2 and 3 will con-
tain flammable gases as hydrogen gas and carbon monoxide. Cabinet nr. 4 will
contain inert but oxygen reducing gases and nr. 5 is, as mentioned, for user
supplies. All the cabinets are made for standard cylinders of 50 liters with a
200 bar pressure, every cabinet will have room for 2-3 cylinders.
How the exhaust system and the pressure valves will be designed isn’t fully
decided yet. However, it will have manometers after every regulator to detect
that the pressure isn’t exceeding the limit of 50 bar (200 bar cylinders will be
used at the primary side before the regulator). Cabinets nr. 2 and 3 (flammable)
are equipped with special pressure vents in order to prevent any leakage or dam-
age on the secondary side after the regulator. There will also be detectors and
controllers for the gas flow. In the hutch at about eyesight, different gas de-
tectors are to assure that no dangerous gases are leaking. There will at least
be specific detectors for hydrogen gas, carbon monoxide, oxygen and one for
detecting gases containing sulfur.
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For inert and the majority of the gases, leakage isn’t a major concern. The
biggest gas cylinders are 50 liters at a maximum of 200 bar pressure, which
would give 10 m3 volume of gas. Compared to the exp. hutch volume which
is almost 173 m3 [16] making the volume only reducing the normal air by 5.8
%. However, for toxic and flammable gases, a gas leakage is far more danger-
ous. At some times liquid nitrogen is used contained in a 200 liters tank within
the hutch. A leak will make the nitrogen go to gas phase and expand 682 times
[17], implying that the tank has a potential of around 137 m3 nitrogen gas which
could fill around 80 % of the hutch. Nitrogen gas is also almost as heavy as oxy-
gen making it rise slowly towards the ceiling. Even if the two gases are entirely
separated, there will only be oxygen up to around 85 cm above the ground. The
gas will however most likely be ventilated quite fast via the ventilation system.
4.9 Chemistry lab
The chemistry labs are available for all the users at MAX IV who have taken the
safety course regarding the chemistry labs. This means that they don’t belong
to any specific beamline and are placed with access from the main hall. The
chemistry labs can be used for different chemistry purposes such as dealing with
toxic or other dangerous substances. It can also be used to prepare ordinary
samples in one of the fume cupboards. Since the prep. lab at BALDER also
have a fume cupboard, the chemistry lab may not be used so frequently by
BALDER users.
4.10 Electricity
MAX IV will have an power consumption of 5 MW (ka¨lla) which corresponds to
a few percent of the total power consumption of Lund. Most of the electricity
at MAX IV will be used for the linac and the storage rings, but the beamlines
will also be equipped with a lot of power consuming electrical hardware such
as computers, measuring devices and sensors, regulation systems, PSS, pumps,
lights, lasers (not at BALDER), overhead cranes and ovens. Because of the ra-
diation in the hutch, electronic equipment may be damaged, therefore as much
hardware as possible is placed outside. It will most likely be placed somewhere
between the two hutches (the experimental and the optics hutch). However,
there are still many components as the measuring devices for the experiments
that need to be close to the sample, in order to achieve a high signal-to-noise
ratio. This means that the hutch will still be a very high density environment
of electronic equipment.
All electricity and electrical equipment involves some sort of risks, the direct
risk is of course for a person to get a shock. However, all fixed installations
at MAX IV are made by authorized personnel. This means it shouldn’t be a
noticeable higher risks than at other facilities with the same comparable amount
of electronic devices. Since users neither are allowed to bring their own elec-
trical equipment without permission nor work with damaged equipment, they
shouldn’t normally be exposed to these risks as the electricians themselves are.
Even so, they are still obliged to take the necessary precautions in order to
operate safely. This may be when the human factor is noticeable, if something
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isn’t working properly, users may try to correct it themselves and might get a
shock as a consequence.
The electricity can also get indirect consequences, for example starting a fire.
Especially if too many cables are placed together, which could be considered
most likely at some places in MAX IV because of the comprising number of
cables. The number of cables can also lead to persons falling if they aren’t
properly placed. At MAX IV, cable ladders are mounted in the hutch over 2
meters above the ground and on the walls. This reduces the amount of cables at
the floor or in the space area where staff and scientists normally operate. The
overhead crane is placed over the cable ladders to prevent cables going vertically
down to the experiment table from getting damaged by the crane. This is how-
ever still a possible scenario when the overhead crane is moving objects. There
will also be fixed installations at the experiment table where different devices
can be connected instead of needing to draw cables over the floor.
4.11 Accidents and incidents at MAX-lab
In order to evaluate the risks, it might be a good idea to examine similar objects
as a reference of what types of accidents and incidents that can occur at the
new site. MAX-lab itself can be considered a very good reference since both
laboratories are constructed by the same principles. Most of the staff will also
come along to the new facility which in some extent mean the same kind of
reasoning regarding safety. This implies to similar safety measures and risks
prioritizing and at the end it may in some extent lead to similar accidents and
incidents from both happening and being prevented.
It is somewhat problematic to look at previous accidents and incidents at MAX-
lab since the documentation, especially for the first half of its almost 30 years
running, is fairly insufficient. The incident reporting has however increased and
has been improved during the years. From the documentation it is possible to
read about the accidents happening from 2000 until today.
• A small H2S gas leak due to a broken regulator in 2002, where a user
opened the gas cylinder even when already expecting a gas leak by the
smell.
• Another toxic, flammable and corrosive gas leak occurred with methy-
lamine CH3NH2 in 2005. A small cloud of gas emerged when the cylinder
was opened and a smell of ammonia aroused due to a bad rubber hose.
• Regulators on gas cylinders without gaskets, luckily on cylinders contain-
ing inert gases.
• Some incidents have occurred in the chemistry lab where hydrogen fluoride
HF has been placed non-sealed in a locker, and where acetone has been
confused with water.
• Two scientists exposed to beryllium Be from a broken detector in 2014.
• A serious laser accident 2008 where the injured had taken off his safety
goggles during an alignment. Lasers don’t exists at BALDER so they
won’t be a threat for these users.
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• A scientist and his son was exposed to radiation while being inside the
nuclear facility experiment station while the beam was running due to a
misunderstanding. The maximal dose of exposure was considered less or
equal to a dental radiography (typically 5 to 10 µSv [22]). This event isn’t
documented and therefore undated.
Along with these accidents and incidents at MAX-lab are numerous of small
fires and staff getting electrified. Also numerous of minor injuries while working
with tools and machines. Many accidents and incidents have probably not been
reported during the years. This reason could be that no one has had a clear
assignment of handling incident reports or simply that persons don’t feel the
need of reporting minor injuries.
4.12 User visiting process
In order to understand what risks the guest scientists (users) may encounter,
it is necessary to consider the phases and steps that are undertaken within the
whole user process. This is shown in figure 11 where the different phases are
categorized in chronological order with underlying steps within each phase.
Figure 11: An illustration over the steps and phases within the user process.
Note that this is a simplified illustration and only shows the basic concepts.
Normally many of the steps happen simultaneously and information is shared
during the whole process.
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• Pre-proposal phase: Here is where the first contact the MAX IV Labora-
tory is made. The proposal creator gather information from the beamline
staff and sometimes from the safety staff as well depending on the exper-
iment. Usually scientist already have a good knowledge of which method
to use in order to carry out the experiment. They also often know what
type of equipment they need during the beamtime and if they require ma-
terials that may be increasing the risk of the experiment. If so, this is
where the safety staff needs to be informed.
• Proposal submission phase: Now it is time to send in the proposal, includ-
ing information about what type of experiment and what they might need.
At BALDER and the other beamlines that manage gases and chemicals,
information about which types required in the experiment must also be
presented in the proposal. They also propose desired dates to experiment
and for how long they want to stay and how many they are. Usually
they are between two and four persons, but for some shorter experiments,
around a 16 hour shift, they can be alone as well.
• Proposal review phase: In this stage, the formal proposal is up for in-
spection, and is controlled by the beamline and safety staff to make sure
that the experiment is feasible. The beamline check consists for example
if the experiment itself actually can be carried out at that specific beam-
line or perhaps if another beamline with another experimental setup and
method is better. At specific experiments, the safety staff mostly focus
on if unconventional methods will be used or equipment and special gases
should be brought in. If so, this has to be investigated further to be sure
that the experiment can be carried out in a considerable safe way. Both
the beamline staff and the safety staff have to approve to the proposal.
If not, then the proposal is denied. Otherwise it passes through to the
Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) for a final approval. PAC is the
division where all experiments are brought in for the last permission step
and they also decides which experiments that will be carried out. All the
approved experiments are then distributed to the beamlines for schedul-
ing. Note that the person writing the proposal isn’t necessary one of
the persons who actually perform the experiments at the site and is not
necessarily considered a user.
• Pre-beamtime phase: If the proposal is approved, the next step is for
the user to register their visit and update information in MAX IV U,
see section 4.4. The registration is required for every user at the MAX
IV Laboratory. At this stage, it is also necessary to perform the online
safety course which is described further in section 4.2. The safety course is
mandatory to pass for all of the users in order to carry out the experiment.
If it isn’t read and signed before the visit, it must be made on site before
entering the protected and controlled areas. At the same time, another
safety check is made to be fully certain that the experiment once again is
considered feasible.
• Beamtime phase: This is the main stage, both for the process itself and
for this report, since this is the only stage where users actually visit the
site. Therefore it will be described further in section 4.12.1 together with
figure 12.
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• Post-beamtime phase: After the visit and the users have returned home,
they are obliged to write a small report of their experiments of what they
have done and what their conclusion is. They also need to submit feedback
regarding their pre visit phases and especially the visit (beamtime) phase.
4.12.1 Beamtime phase
The usual duration of the beamtime phase is often half a day to a couple of days
for the hard X-ray beamlines, and one to two weeks for the soft X-ray beam-
lines. This is due to the baking process and vacuum pumping that consumes
very much of the beamtime for the soft X-ray beamlines. At BALDER, which
uses hard X-rays, this isn’t any bigger problem. When the users arrive to the
MAX IV Laboratory, which can be any day of the week, they are required to
contact a person from the beamline staff of the specific beamline they are about
to use, often passed on by the administration. The staff member then guides
the users to the specific beamline where at least one is given practical informa-
tion in safety and how to operate the beamline in general on site. Regarding
safety, the PSS (see section 4.3) is demonstrated and explained. Also, where
to go during an emergency evacuation and measures in case of an accident. He
or she has then the responsibility to inform the rest of the users in the team.
This is usually made on normal weekdays when most of the staff is working
but can also be carried out during weekends if any beamline staff is available.
Note that without this introduction to the beamline, no user is allowed to start
experiment. If the safety staff also needs to get involved, then this introduc-
tion always takes place at normal weekdays. Other information regarding safety
can be how to turn on or connect gas containers to the system, using the head
crane (a special education mandatory and should normally not be carried out
by users) or to use the prep. lab. Much of the information is also about how the
software interface is used and how the beam and the gas system is controlled
from the computers.
There is however no strict regulations or guidelines today of what happens
if the user who was given the practical safety instructions leaves before the
experiment is carried through. Today, this information is only passed on to an-
other user by the informed team member, which hasn’t the same authority and
knowledge as the beamline staff to present this information. This may lead to
misunderstandings and information loss along the way. This problem will also
occur every time the safety informed user is away from the beamline. On the
other hand, there shouldn’t be anything at the beamline making a user more
vulnerable and exposed to danger if they only have taken the web safety course.
If this is seen as a concern, the direct solution is demanding every user to get
instructed directly by the beamline staff as well, which may increase their work-
load.
When the users has completed the introduction of the beamline, they are ready
for the start-up. The start-up includes steps like preparing samples in the prep.
lab or in the chemistry lab. At MAX-lab, most of the preparations should be
made in the chemistry lab since there is no prep. lab adjacent to the I811. But
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Figure 12: The beamtime phase illustrated in further detail with some of the sub
categories in which the beamtime phase holds. The background colors describe
in which location within the beamline where the event is taking place.
since it can be quite far to the chemistry lab, some sample preparations are
made in the control room instead. At BALDER, there is, as shown in figure
10, a prep. lab adjacent to the beamline itself. In the prep. lab, there will be
an oven, a fume cupboard and a glove box. The glove box will have an inert
argon environment in order to prevent impurities at the sample. The samples
are often not more than a couple of grams and the concentrations of the desired
substance can be as low as down to ppm. The samples often contains of a small
brick. The brick has a hole where the substance is filled and sealed with lead
free tape (to not interfere with the core electron interactions). However, many
different samples are used depending on what type and in what physical state
it is, meaning the gas itself can be the sample. Preparations usually take a
couple of minutes per sample. This can however take several hours depending
on the number of samples and if it’s a critical mixture process with exact con-
centrations or masses. Preparations must also be made with the beamline itself
since different experiment require different experimental setups. At BALDER,
some experiments requires samples contained in a gas chamber and some do
not require any containment at all. Different experiments also require different
types of gas mixtures with different kinds of pressure. This is made in order
to both detect how the gas reacts with the sample, or to prevent it to react at
all and to prevent any other substance from interfere with the collected data.
Depending on the thickness of the sample, the absorption is measured either
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direct with a detector behind the sample, or indirect using fluorescence with
a detector around 45◦ angle in front of the sample. The preparations of the
experimental setup can often require a couple of hours. It can also take as little
as no time if all settings are as for the previous experiment. At the I811, using
diffraction spectroscopy will most likely require the most amount of work in
order to prepare, and it can take up to a couple of days including the alignment
of the beam. Since this method isn’t used at BALDER, this will no longer be
a problem. At MAX-lab, there is no beamtime for any users at Mondays since
this time is reserved for maintenance of the synchrotron. This becomes a good
time for new users with long start-ups to prepare their experiments. There will
be something similar at MAX IV, but how the periods for maintenance will be
scheduled isn’t decided yet.
After the preparations, it is time to mount the samples, do the PSS search
sequence (see 4.3) and open the beam stopper to start the experiment. At
BALDER, there will be a rotating plate with multiple samples. This makes
the beamtime more efficient since it reduces the number of times users needs
to enter the hutch and change samples. To mount or change samples usually
take a couple of minutes at the I811. At BALDER, it is harder to tell because
of the multi sample rotating disc. There will most likely be several discs to
rotate between so one of them always is irradiated in the hutch. The samples
are only in the magnitude of grams, meaning the holder of the disc mechanism
doesn’t need to be fixed so hard and probably is changed in the order of minutes
as well. Regarding gas samples, it is more a question of mixing different types
with different concentrations. This can be made from the control room meaning
no extra visits to the exp. hutch in this case as well.
During experiments, the users may prepare other samples or subsequently ana-
lyze incoming data or work at something else on their computers. In between,
it also may be needed to do gas mixtures or to change empty gas containers.
This regards mainly the eventual own brought gases in gas cabinet nr. 5 (see
section 4.8) since the other cabinets most likely will be supplied by the main
staff. Otherwise the actual experiment stage is, if everything works as it suppose
to, mainly about waiting.
During the waiting time there are some non work related things to do such
as go to the gym in the basement of the main office building. There is also a
possibility to cook or prepare food in the coffee room/kitchen also in the main
office building. Usually the scientists work in shifts to monitor the experiments
which can take several hours at a time, especially with a rotating disc technique
for the samples. Note that if hazardous gases (toxic, flammable, radioactive
etc.) is used, then they will need at least one person to monitor the experiment
due to prevent unexpected events or accidents.
When the beamtime is about to finish, the users clean up and collect or throws
away their waste. Usually, the waste is harmless and can be recycled as any
other waste. If it is considered harmful, the handling process is dealt with in
the pre-beamtime phase together with the safety staff.
To be a user at sciences facilities like the MAX IV Laboratory can be quite
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different from what scientists are used to at their regular working places. Some
may only visit the laboratory one time in their life and the preparations can
be months. For this reason, they may feel stressed during the visit, especially
if everything isn’t working properly. This may also lead to longer and more
exhausting working days than expected, which may lead to irrational thinking.
Therefore it is very important that the safety systems are as fail-safe and simple
as possible. The beamtime phase doesn’t require so many decisions under a long
period of time as well, this will probably also affect awareness and may reduce
the alertness of the users.
5 Analysis
The process for a user during a visit has been described in section 4.12. A
user is spending most time during work time in the prep. lab, the beamline
control room, the exp. hutch and possibly the chemistry lab. The different
identified risks are shown in figure 13 where the different percentages describes
roughly how much time spent at each location. It should be noted that these
percentages are only a typical example of an ”ordinary” visit. The times can
vary drastically, especially for a large user team with different assignments.
Some of them may for example sit in the prep. lab or chemistry lab the entire
beamtime, in order to provide prepared samples for the rest of the team to mount
and examine. Sometimes, the experimental setup has to be reconstructed to fit
the users specific demands and sometimes it is properly adjusted right from the
beginning. It can also be something wrong somewhere at the beamline path
that takes time to adjust or repair, meaning the percentage of time spent at
each location can vary vastly. It also depend on the duration of the visit, these
percentages are based on a beamtime of 24-48 hours.
The figure shows the different identified risks for the different locations.
As can be seen, some of the locations have more risks than others and some
categories of risks are more represented than others. However, it doesn’t say
anything about the magnitude of the risks other than that it may be present.
5.1 Radiation
Regarding radiation, there are relatively few risks at most experimental loca-
tions. Except for radioactive materials and samples, most of the risks regarding
radiation are only present in the hutch during beamtime. Furthermore, radioac-
tive samples are very rare, and they are treated with extra care and precautions.
The amounts are also often very low since experiments at BALDER require less
than a gram. The radiation in the hutch (X-ray radiation) is fairly low. To be
locked in for an hour while the beam is running may increase the probability for
cancer in the next decades, but the amount won’t kill or harm anyone directly.
For beamline staff and frequently returning users this may however be fatal if
repeated and put into routine. The radiation is of course a risk and should be
avoided as much as possible at all times. The risk of radiation however, is much
larger at other parts of the facility such as the linac and the storage rings. The
optics hutch is also much more dangerous to be left inside than the exp. hutch
due to radiation since only a few percent of the beam intensity leaves the optics
hutch. The optics hutch is not a concern for ordinary users.
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Figure 13: Risks for users at BALDER shown in a matrix for different types of
risks in the different locations, along with an approximate time spent at each
location in percent.
5.2 Gases and Chemicals
Gases and chemicals are used frequently, especially at BALDER where they play
an important roll. These risks are primarily in the exp. hutch and the chemistry
lab, since the argon gas provided to the glove box in the prep. lab is inert and
in a small amount. As mentioned in section 4.8, most of the gas will be lead into
the hutch from the outside (the main hall) and will be controlled by computers
in the control room. The exception will possibly be cabinet nr. 5 if placed
inside the hutch. Also, temporary nitrogen tanks in the hutch will represent a
risk. Even if the cylinders may contain different substances, as long as they are
contained, they are usually not of a concern. Most of the risks regarding gases
involves some sort of leakage. A gas leakage inside the hutch will most often
not be a problem if they are inert since, as mentioned earlier, they can only fill
about 5.8 % of the air space. It can however be a problem with liquid nitrogen
because of its expanding volume. Often a leakage is noticeable for example with
a sound, vapor or a temperature drop, but it may also be something no one is
reacting to. Since a leakage can empty a tank quite fast and relatively quiet an
expansion may reduce the oxygen level rapidly, as mentioned up to 80 % of the
hutch volume. It may also create frostbites at exposed body parts.
Most of the ordinary gas cylinders themselves are placed outside the hutch in gas
cabinets, and a leakage would then be more of a concern in the main hall. Each
gas cabinet is also ventilated to prevent gas from spreading within the facility
so it would not be of any concern. It is more of a problem if a tube from the gas
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system is leaking within the hutch, with the exception of the inert gases. The
containment of the hutch can then make the gas levels high enough to constitute
severe threats if leaking. A flammable mixture can for example cause a fire if
ignited by static electricity. Hydrogen H2 is one of the flammable gases used
monthly at BALDER and it has a flammable range of 4 to 75 % [19] making
it likely to be within the range if the whole content of the cylinder leaks out in
the hutch. Since it is so much lighter than air, it can reach those concentrations
relatively fast at the ceiling. However, both gas and pressure detectors will give
an alarm if they are working properly and are installed correctly, and then tell
the shut-off valve to turn off the system before the concentrations become too
high. The ventilation in the hutch will also reduce the gas concentrations. It is
therefore very important that it works as it should.
Highly toxic gases such as carbon monoxide CO, nitrogen dioxide NO2 and
hydrogen sulfide H2S will be used regularly and can be harmful even at very
low concentrations. The toxicity may represent a higher probability risk if leak-
ing than the flammability since it doesn’t need to reach a certain concentration
before being harmful. However, the flammable gases are more dangerous in
case of a fire instead. This is why cabinet nr. 5 inside the hutch is of a ma-
jor concern, and may be one of the biggest challenges when designing the gas
system. Cabinet nr. 5 is planned to handle 5 liter 200 bar gas cylinders, and
will have user supplied gases depending on the experiment. These special gases
needs to be evaluated by the safety and beamline staff before they are approved.
Cabinet nr. 5 is also never supposed to be used for storage of gases, only used
during experiments. One of the more frequent user gases is hydrogen sulfide
H2S which is considered highly toxic. In this case, a gas leakage would mean
that the whole bottle of 1000 liters (1 m3) has a potential of leaking out in the
hutch. Since this can give a concentration of 0.58 % and the risk level is 0.1
% for nearly instant death [20], making it very dangerous if a leakage occur.
It should be noted that the gas is placed inside a cabinet with ventilation, the
hutch has also its own ventilation making it less likely to have a gas leakage
at the same time as a ventilation failure. The gas cylinder is also connected
to a blow-off valve if the pressure rises. Along with the gas detector for sulfur,
there are many barriers if a leak would happen. A possible hazard may be a
leakage of a pipe, this could lead to severe consequences if the leakage is close
to a person working in the hutch. The local concentration is then much higher
and hasn’t had time to be diluted. It may be unlikely for this to happen but
the consequences can be very severe for persons within the hutch.
The chemistry lab may also contain numerous of dangerous gases but will not
be analyzed further in detail since it is out of topic regarding this report. It
is however a risk for BALDER users since they may go there to prepare their
samples. Since persons from all beamlines (with proper education) are able to
work in the chemistry lab, it makes the possibility that dangerous chemicals
and gases are prepared there and may easier be mixed with each other if not
labeled and placed correctly. By applying the proper equipment for the users
in the prep. lab, they are more likely to prepare their samples there because of
the distance, plus they don’t need to undergo an extra safety course.
35
5.3 Fire
Fire is a risk at every facility and there are countless of reasons for why it might
start. In the prep. lab, the most likely risk that can cause a fire is the oven.
The oven is of an ordinary type and can be found in any regular kitchen. The
amounts baked in the oven will most often be fairly low, a couple of grams. If
so, it is probably not a high risk scenario for it to start a fire, probably less
than for an ordinary oven in every household. The same reasoning goes for the
exp. hutch where computer, other hardware and furniture are the potential fire
threats, just as in any ordinary living room or office.
In the exp. hutch, the largest threat of fire are the gases which are analyzed in
the previous section of gases and chemicals. Except for the cables and hardware,
the exp. hutch also has an oven. This oven however, is very small compared
to an regular oven and have an inner volume of a couple of mm3. Even if it
has a capacity of 900◦, the heated volume will be so small it wouldn’t affect the
temperature noticeably in the hutch, even if the oven is leaking.
5.4 Electricity
Electricity at the MAX IV Laboratory has been described in section 4.10. Elec-
tricity in general is, like fire, always a risk. MAX IV and BALDER contain
many different kinds of electrical equipment, and can contribute to lethal dam-
ages if not installed and maintained correctly.
In Sweden, around 3-6 persons die every year in accidents involving electric-
ity. Most of them are either authorized electricians, laymen in their homes or
children. This can be seen as an indication that as long as users aren’t doing
anything they shouldn’t do e.g. fixing damaged hardware, then the probability
of an accident involving electricity is fairly low. Extra consideration should be
taken when operating the overhead crane, since it can be controlled into dam-
aging both hardware and cables. The overhead crane requires however extra
education and isn’t normally operated by users. It should be pointed out to the
users that if they damage something, they should be encouraged to report it to
authorized personnel and never try fixing it themselves. [21]
5.5 Miscellaneous
At BALDER, there are many other risks which aren’t included in the major
categories. The oven in the prep. lab has beside the risk of fires, also a risk
for burns if safety equipment isn’t used properly and if proper safety equipment
isn’t provided. This may also depend on tiredness which is a factor that can
increase the probability for a risks to occur. Tiredness can for example cause a
user to open the wrong valves and mix the wrong gases from the control room,
or to not install the right equipment at the right place during setup. It is not
only a risk of safety but making the wrong decisions when tired can ruin the
experiment as well. The samples can be damaged if mixing the wrong gases
or just by being clumsy and dropping them etc. Tiredness is a concern for ev-
ery location the user is visiting. Since the beamtime can have a long duration,
tiredness will affect almost all of the users. Therefore it is necessary to try to
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facilitate for doing things right and not wrong, the safest way should also be
the easiest to as large extent as possible.
The type of sample robot in the hutch isn’t decided yet and is therefore hard
to evaluate if it may form some sort of risk or not. There will be moving parts
in order to irradiate different samples, but it will probably not require so much
force in order to change the relatively light samples. It is also not supposed to
run when persons are in the hutch. The environment in the hutch can also be
quite messy. At the I811, there are tools in many locations, cables on the floor
and sometimes devices that you have to duck under. This will probably not
be the case at BALDER or any other beamline from the start. It can however
be a problem after time, especially when new equipment is installed and users
and staff disorganize tools etc. All these things can be causing injuries when for
example a person is slipping on them or walks into sharp or hard edges or the
overhead crane when loaded. This along with illness and other threats can cause
persons to pass out, and even have greater consequences if it happens within
the hutch. It can take a long time before anyone finds them there plus that the
environment with gases, radiation etc. can be of a concern if the person doesn’t
wakes up, especially if not found during PSS. Since the room is so small and
with no places to remain hidden during a PSS search, it is very unlikely they
aren’t found if not made intentionally.
5.6 The bowtie model
Using the bowtie model, the risks and barriers can be illustrated for a better
understanding of where improvement is needed. For this bowtie model, there
are two top events ”Gas leakage/explosion” and ”User pass out in the hutch”
connected to two different hazards. The reason of why these two where chosen
as top events is that they represent two of the main events at BALDER that
are strongly connected to many of the risks shown in figure 13 covering many
aspects. The figure shows however only a few of the many threats, consequences
and barriers but gives an illustration of what can happen if the barriers fail.
Linked to the top events are the threats and consequences. The reason why
a gas leakage occur is that the cylinder or that the gas system including pressure
and flow meters, vents, pipes, connections etc. gets damaged. It can also be
someone who forgot to close the system properly or forgot a gasket while mount-
ing a regulator on a cylinder. Usually the pressure meters and the detectors for
the different gases will alarm and close the system automatically (barriers), but
they may for some reasons not be functional or too slow. As mentioned before,
a leakage within the hutch can have large consequences right from the start if
someone is present. A gas explosion can be triggered by an increase of the inner
pressure in the cylinder itself. The main reason why the pressure increases in
a gas cylinder is the increase in temperature. This could be the case if a fire
starts. Since all cylinders are in 30 minutes fireproof cabinets, the fire must be
very massive in order for it to heat up the cylinders to explode. At this time,
the building is probably evacuated a long time ago, and there is probably not
anything more to do than for the emergency service to try extinguish the fire
and save what’s left of the building or simply to let it burn up. An explosion
can also occur for example by flammable gases that has been spread out in the
air and stays within its explosion range along with some sort of ignition source.
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Figure 14: A Bowtie model over the three top events ”Gas leakage/explosion”
and ”user pass out in the hutch” which are all independent of each other. Re-
garding the barriers, note that the model only describes what can happen if the
barriers fail. The barriers will work differently depending on the threat, but
in general, the barriers shut down the gas flow and close the incoming beam,
and in some cases they even turn off the whole accelerator if activated. The
PSS works more preventative and will deny beam access if the PSS search isn’t
performed correctly.
The ignition source could be static electricity being released or simply a flame.
This may start a fire which then can repeat the process by making other cylin-
ders explode, or damaging other gas pipes.
A user passing out in the hutch can happen for many reasons. Some of these
threats can be possible consequences of the other two top events for many rea-
sons, but it isn’t necessary and they are not dependent of each other. For
example a fire can start because of a gas explosion, but it can also start from
electricity or an oven. Low oxygen levels is a threat probably caused by a leak
from the liquid nitrogen gas tank. It may also be from a failure of the ventila-
tion, but it isn’t likely since the door is (at least should be) open when persons
are present in the hutch. Some threats are likely to happen at other places
than BALDER and MAX IV as well like fire, shocks from electricity, diseases
and getting knocked out by for example slipping. The consequences depends
on what type of threat causing the accident and how it happened, but also for
how long it takes before the person is found. It can be a risky environment,
especially if a person works alone. The risks also varies depending on many
different factors as which types of gases that are used.
There are more barriers than described in this model. For example can the
safety course be seen as a barrier in order for a user to take the right safety
measures during beamtime. The gas cabinets insulates the gas cylinders from
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the environment. To reduce radiation, the hutch is made by a thick layer of
lead etc. This bowtie model is designed to illustrate some of the main parts for
three of the most interesting top events and probably highest risks specific for
the beamline BALDER, where gas and radiation are the most noticeable risks.
6 Result
The identified risks of importance are evaluated and put into the risk matrix
for probability and consequences below in figure 15. Note that accidents from
these risks may also mean severe damage to the equipment, this is not taken
into consideration due to the user perspective of this report.
The risks in the figure can be categorized depending on how general or spe-
cific they are for BALDER. The general risks exists on most regular working
places, for example fire and electricity. The ones that are special for MAX IV
and don’t exists on most regular places are especially the radiation and in some
extent the gas handling and lasers (not at BALDER). The more specific risks
for BALDER compared to the other beamlines is the gas handling; high gas
pressure, high gas temperatures and the containment of gases inside the hutch.
Some of the more general risks are however higher in this environment since
other specific risks can contribute to both their probability and their conse-
quence. For example can a gas leakage lead to a fire as seen in figure 14. The
reason of a categorization like this is to separate the work and to make it clear
who has which responsibility. For this report, a categorization might be good in
order to separate the risks that needs to be dealt with for BALDER specifically.
This report may also work as a substrate for other beamlines to see what type
of risks that are specific for them. The general MAX IV risks are something to
work further on as well, especially for the safety staff.
As can be seen in figure 15, the evaluated highest risks are to get electrified,
full scale fires and gas leakages in the hutch containing toxic or other type of
harmful gases. Since these risks can trigger each other, it may be a good idea
to isolate them further from each other, for example by thermal insulation gas
pipes and certain boxes for electric hardware. There should also be very strict
rules of how to manage toxic gases within the hutch. Since all gas flows are
automated, to mount the gas bottle should probably be the last thing carried
out before starting the PSS search. It should maybe require a pressure safety
test with a harmless gas before. The gas bottle should always stand inside the
cabinet nr. 5 when inside the hutch because of its ventilation. All users mon-
itoring toxic gases should perhaps undergo special safety instructions by the
beamline or safety staff. Radiation, considered by many the most characteristic
risk of MAX IV, is in this matrix evaluated lower than most other risks. One
reason is that radiation is a relatively easy risk to reduce with thick lead walls
and concrete. It is also dealt with at high extent at every hard X-ray beamline
including the linac and the storage rings. The radiation is also far higher in the
linac and in the storage rings as well as in the optics hutch compared to the
exp. hutch which this risk describes. There is also the PSS, and even if someone
is left in the exp. hutch while the beam is running, the concern will probably
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Figure 15: The matrix shows some of the most noticeable risks for users at
BALDER evaluated in a risk matrix. The table below describes the meaning of
the different probabilities and consequences.
Probability Event occurring interval (years) Consequence Description
Very unlikely >50 Trivial No treatment required
Unlikely 31 - 50 Minor Minor injury requiring First Aid treatment
Possible 16 - 30 Significant Injury requiring medical treatment
Likely 6 - 15 Major Serious injury requiring special medical treatment
Often ≤5 Severe Loss of life or permanent disability
more be of how it could happen rather than the actual damage.
The risks are placed in the matrix by evaluation of different aspects. The
probabilities is in a large extent based on previous accidents and incidents at
MAX-lab and the I811 since they are so similar laboratories. The consequences
are quite hard to determine since it vastly depends on what really is meant by
the different risks and accidents. Here below is every risk from the matrix in
figure 15 described how it is evaluated.
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• Radiation accident in the exp. hutch: Very unlikely and has never hap-
pened in the the history of MAX-lab, only in the nuclear research facility
in the basement. In the exp. hutch, the radiation exposure will probably
be less than for a visit at the dentist depending on the duration.
• Minor damage from tools and equipment: Small cuts or crushing injuries,
slipping on the floor. Happens every year and does most often not need
any certain treatment.
• Burns from oven: The prep. lab oven, will probably occur as likely as
at any other conventional oven. The usage ratio of the oven will however
probably be quite low. The burns may need to be cooled down.
• Regulator failure: Makes the pressure increase at the secondary side. It’s
considered likely to happen within 15 years because of the high gas usage
at the beamline. It will probably not result in anything more than a
release of the pressure vessel and an alarm. It can however lead to a gas
leak both inside and outside the hutch.
• Liquid nitrogen leak: A possible event, will probably not be more than a
small frostbite. At worst in a very unlikely event, it could lead to lack of
oxygen and a user passing out in the hutch.
• Small scale fire: Is considered likely and at MAX-lab, small cable fires
happen every year. May not require any treatment at all, it may however
need to be examined by a doctor due to inhalation of smoke.
• Overhead crane accident: An unlikely event, especially since most users
won’t operate the crane. The consequence can be anything from a push
from the moving object or getting heavy equipment dropped over a person.
• Get electrified: A possible event, especially if someone try to fix broken
things by themselves. The consequence depends on the type, duration and
magnitude of the current and how it passes through the body meaning
everything from a trivial to a severe consequence. This event refers to
the more rare type of electrical accidents with a high current traveling
through the body.
• Passing out in the exp. hutch: Unlikely and has never happened at MAX-
lab. May be almost trivial in some cases to severe in others. It is consid-
ered major since the person is often alone in the hutch and it may take
time before he or she is found. In cases of for example heart and brain
diseases or bleeding, the time is crucial and treatment is needed as fast as
possible.
• Full scale fire: A very unlikely event that can be catastrophic. The users
are hopefully alerted by the fire alarms in time to evacuate.
• Gas explosion: A very unlikely event with a possible severe outcome. It
is perhaps even more dangerous than a full scale fire because of the fast
sequence of events.
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• Toxic gas leak inside the exp. hutch: Not so likely to occur since toxic
gases are contained in a cabinet. Although, still possible through pipes or
gas chamber leakages. The consequence may be severe depending on the
gas and concentration along with the exposure duration.
7 Discussion
It should be easier making the right decision than making the wrong one. If
applied to risk analysis, the right decision should always be the safer one. At the
MAX IV Laboratory, it is easy to see how improvements have and is made at
the new facility. The older MAX-lab has been constructed and developed over a
long time. Safety at this site has been updated and improved continuously, still
not regulated and not always reaching up to safety standards as newer similar
facilities has. This is probably because it would require major revisions of both
the construction and regulations which may not be viable in an economical and
time perspective, especially due to its closure and the focus of MAX IV instead.
However, it doesn’t mean that the safety at MAX-lab is bad, especially not with
its preconditions. But compared to the new MAX IV, where the safety aspect
has been at the agenda since day one of the construction, a lot of things have
been improved regarding the safety according to my opinion. The improve-
ments also regards BALDER specifically compared to I811; the PSS, chicanes,
the floor plan including prep lab, placing of gas containers and the automation
of the gas system. Also, just by placing a type of sample robot inside the hutch
will (according to plan) drastically reduce the exp. hutch visit frequency for the
users. However, there is always room for improvement and keeping the safety
as high as possible is a continuous work. According to the PDCA cycle one
might say that this report mostly represents the C - Check and a little of the
P - Plan in the first cycle. The check may include everything except the gas
system which more or less have been developed but not constructed under the
time of writing. Most safety measures have been planned long before this report
was started and has been constructed to some extent. This report, is more a
view from the outside of someone who hasn’t been affected or influenced for so
long by the general opinions.
My result, as illustrated in figure 15, is not exactly what I expected at the
start, comparing the radiation risks against the risks of gases. As I have men-
tioned before, the safety measures against radiation is relatively easy to carry
out in form of thick walls. And parts not so easy to make like the PSS is well
thought trough instead, at least at MAX IV. It is clearly a risk that everyone at
the MAX IV Laboratory is well aware of and is talking about almost daily. A
problem with this may be that other risks become secondary. My impressions in
the beginning of the research was that radiation was the considered highest risk
at MAX IV. It is probably the case in the linac and the storage rings and prob-
ably the optics hutches as well, but not necessary at the rest of the beamlines.
This is however one of the reasons I was assigned to look closer at BALDER,
since it will be able to handle gas mixtures at high pressure. This is in my opin-
ion a very advanced system to construct and probably more advanced compared
to the radiation safety. It should perhaps be the first thing to investigate when
building BALDER and other beamlines dealing with harmful gases. On the
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other hand, it may be difficult to construct the gas system without knowing the
properties and dimensions of the hutch. Perhaps it could have been discussed
more in advance with the persons constructing it making it not so stressful to
finish within the time limit. Also, as long as research progress, the need for
more and more harmful and rare gases will increase which may probably lead
to more frequent usage of dangerous gases at BALDER. Together with the gas
system, the ventilation should be checked regularly in order to prevent gas ac-
cumulations. Other than that, the rest of the results can be considered fairly
similar to what one might expect with similar risks compare to industries.
Another thing to consider may be the education of the users. The new safety
course is under development and there are some things that might be mentioned
that isn’t conventional in a safety course. First of all it is a good idea to mention
something about tiredness while working at the beamlines and how it affects the
mind. It can encourage people to plan their work time ahead in order to pre-
vent them from making difficult decisions while tired. As mentioned, it should
be easy making the right decisions but when tired, the right decision doesn’t
always seem right. The safety course should also encourage users not to fix bro-
ken equipment by themselves, especially if it involves electricity, they could get
injured. People can and are making mistakes and to have a forgetting environ-
ment and culture, it will hopefully lead to more damaged equipment reported
and repaired to thereby increasing safety. The practical beamline education by
the beamline staff should perhaps be mandatory for every user operating at the
specific beamline as well. Today only one needs to participate in this part of
the safety course and is then to tell the rest of the users. In my opinion, it can
lead to misunderstandings and wrong decisions made, especially if the educated
person isn’t present at the beamline. The practical beamline education works
partly as a barrier to prevent accidents but can in this case easily be set aside.
However, it can contribute to a greater work load for the beamline staff, but
shouldn’t in most cases be increased significantly since all of the users can be
educated at once.
BALDER is at today’s date not finished and will not, according to schedule,
be totally complete before the end of 2016. Some other things to consider in
order to increase safety before it is finished is the placement of the PSS search
buttons. To improve the search further, or for future beamlines, it could be a
good idea to place some buttons at the experiment table instead. This would
ease for the searcher to not have to thinking of turning around from the wall but
are forced to do so automatically. My own experience of performing a search is
that you look more into the wall than around. The new PSS at MAX IV will
however have a minimum time between pressing buttons which may reduce this
relatively minor problem. Another perhaps bigger issue which isn’t decided yet
is how the transportation of flammable gases will be carried out while BALDER
is operational. It is said today that flammable gases will only be placed at the
beamline during beamtime. This will require transportation of for example H2
back and forth to the gas containment room many times a month which also
can be considered as a risk. The cylinder could be dropped into the ground and
get damaged, or the truck carrying it could drive into something or someone. If
the MAX IV staff or users themselves will be responsible for the transportation
isn’t decided either. At the same time, it is probably not a good idea to have
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harmful gases placed around the site while unused.
8 Risk reduction suggestions
In order to conclude how risks from a user perspective at BALDER can be
reduced, here are some suggestion of improvements:
• Investigate the gas handling of the gas cabinet inside the hutch (cabinet
nr. 5) further to prevent toxic leakages.
• Consider a passage between the prep. lab, control room and the hutch
preventing unnecessary contamination by samples. This could also be
applied to future beamlines.
• Improve the safety instruction routines for arriving users.
• PSS buttons may be placed on the exp. table for a better view.
• Develop the gas transportation routines between BALDER and the gas
storage room.
• Mirrors around the beamline to prevent collisions.
• Apply systematic incident reporting.
• Facilitate for incident and damage reporting from users and urge them to
do so in the online safety course.
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